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Terror database casts a wide net
Watch list has quadrupled in size, raising management and privacy
concerns
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http://www.msnbc.msn.com
Updated: 12:14 a.m. CT March 25, 2007
Each day, thousands of pieces of intelligence information from around the
world — field reports, captured documents, news from foreign allies and
sometimes idle gossip — arrive in a computer-filled office in McLean, where
analysts feed them into the nation’s central list of terrorists and terrorism
suspects.
Called TIDE, for Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment, the list is a
storehouse for data about individuals that the intelligence community believes
might harm the United States. It is the wellspring for watch lists distributed
to airlines, law enforcement, border posts and U.S. consulates, created to close
one of the key intelligence gaps revealed after Sept. 11, 2001: the failure of
federal agencies to share what they knew about al-Qaeda operatives.
Watch list sets low bar But in addressing one problem, TIDE has spawned
others. Ballooning from fewer than 100,000 files in 2003 to about 435,000, the
growing database threatens to overwhelm the people who manage it. “The single
biggest worry that I have is long-term quality control,” said Russ Travers, in
charge of TIDE at the National Counterterrorism Center in McLean. “Where am I
going to be, where is my successor going to be, five years down the road?”
TIDE has also created concerns about secrecy, errors and privacy. The list
marks the first time foreigners and U.S. citizens are combined in an
intelligence database. The bar for inclusion is low, and once someone is on the
list, it is virtually impossible to get off it. At any stage, the process can
lead to “horror stories” of mixed-up names and unconfirmed information, Travers
acknowledged.
The watch lists fed by TIDE, used to monitor everyone entering the country
or having even a casual encounter with federal, state and local law enforcement,
have a higher bar. But they have become a source of irritation — and
potentially more serious consequences — for many U.S. citizens and
visitors.
Thousands of erroneous hits In 2004 and 2005, misidentifications
accounted for about half of the tens of thousands of times a traveler’s name
triggered a watch-list hit, the Government Accountability Office reported in
September. Congressional committees have criticized the process, some charging
that it collects too much information about Americans, others saying it is
ineffective against terrorists. Civil rights and privacy groups have called for
increased transparency.
“How many are on the lists, how are they compiled, how is the information
used, how do they verify it?” asked Lillie Coney, associate director of the
Washington-based Electronic Privacy Information Center. Such information is
classified, and individuals barred from traveling are not told why.
Sen. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) said last year that his wife had been delayed
repeatedly while airlines queried whether Catherine Stevens was the watch-listed
Cat Stevens. The listing referred to the Britain-based pop singer who converted
to Islam and changed his name to Yusuf Islam. The reason Islam is not allowed to
fly to the United States is secret.
So is the reason Maher Arar, a Syrian-born Canadian, remains on the State
Department’s consular watch list. Detained in New York while en route to
Montreal in 2002, Arar was sent by the U.S. government to a year of imprisonment
in Syria. Canada, the source of the initial information about Arar, cleared him
of all terrorism allegations last September — three years after his release —
and has since authorized $9 million in compensation.
TIDE is a vacuum cleaner for both proven and unproven information, and its
managers disclaim responsibility for how other agencies use the data. “What’s
the alternative?” Travers said. “I work under the assumption that we’re never
going to have perfect information — fingerprints, DNA — on 6 billion people
across the planet… . If someone actually has a better idea, I’m all
ears.”
‘Thousands of messages’ The electronic journey a piece of terrorism data
takes from an intelligence outpost to an airline counter is interrupted at
several points for analysis and condensation.
President Bush ordered the intelligence community in 2003 to centralize
data on terrorism suspects, and U.S. agencies at home and abroad now send
everything they collect to TIDE. It arrives electronically as names to be added
or as additional information about people already in the system.
The 80 TIDE analysts get “thousands of messages a day,” Travers said, much
of the data “fragmentary,” “inconsistent” and “sometimes just flat-out wrong.”
Often the analysts go back to the intelligence agencies for details. “Sometimes
you’ll get sort of corroborating information,” he said, “but many times you’re
not going to get much. What we use here, rightly or wrongly, is a
reasonable-suspicion standard.”
Each TIDE listee is given a number, and statistics are kept on nationality
and ethnic and religious groups. Some files include aliases and sightings, and
others are just a full or partial name, perhaps with a sketchy biography. Sunni
and Shiite Muslims are the fastest-growing categories in a database whose
entries include Saudi financiers and Colombian revolutionaries. U.S. citizens —
who Travers said make up less than 5 percent of listings — are included if an
“international terrorism nexus” is established. A similar exception for the
administration’s warrantless wiretap program came under court challenge from
privacy and civil rights advocates.
Information sharing Every night at 10, TIDE dumps an unclassified
version of that day’s harvest — names, dates of birth, countries of origin and
passport information — into a database belonging to the FBI’s Terrorist
Screening Center. TIDE’s most sensitive information is not included. The FBI
adds data about U.S. suspects with no international ties for a combined daily
total of 1,000 to 1,500 new names.
Between 5 and 6 a.m., a shift of 24 analysts drawn from the agencies that
use watch lists begins a new winnowing process at the center’s Crystal City
office. The analysts have access to case files at TIDE and the original
intelligence sources, said the center’s acting director, Rick Kopel.
Decisions on what to add to the Terrorist Screening Center master list are
made by midafternoon. The bar is higher than TIDE’s; total listings were about
235,000 names as of last fall, according to Justice Department Inspector General
Glenn A. Fine. The bar is then raised again as agencies decide which names to
put on their own watch lists: the Transportation Security Administration’s
“no-fly” and “selectee” lists for airlines; Consular Lookout and Support System
at the State Department; the Interagency Border and Inspection System at the
Department of Homeland Security; and the Justice Department’s National Crime
Information Center. The criteria each agency use are classified, Kopel
said.
International red flags Some information may raise a red flag for one
agency but not another. “There’s a big difference between CLASS and no-fly,”
Kopel said, referring to State’s consular list. “About the only criteria CLASS
has is that you’re not a U.S. person… . Say ‘a Mohammed from Syria.’ That’s
useless for me to watch-list here in the United States. But if I’m in Damascus
processing visas … that might be enough for someone to … put a hold on
the visa process.”
All of the more than 30,000 individuals on the TSA’s no-fly list are
prohibited from entering an aircraft in the United States. People whose names
appear on the longer selectee list — those the government believes merit
watching but does not bar from travel — are supposed to be subjected to more
intense scrutiny.
With little to go on beyond names, airlines find frequent matches. The
screening center agent on call will check the file for markers such as sex, age
and prior “encounters” with the list. The agent might ask the airlines about the
passenger’s eye color, height or defining marks, Kopel said. “We’ll say, ‘Does
he have any rings on his left hand?’ and they’ll say, ‘Uh, he doesn’t have a
left hand.’ Okay. We know that [the listed person] lost his left hand making a
bomb.”
If the answers indicate a match, that “encounter” is fed back into the FBI
screening center’s files and ultimately to TIDE. Kopel said the agent never
tells the airline whether the person trying to board is the suspect. The
airlines decide whether to allow the customer to fly.
TSA receives thousands of complaints each year, such as this one released
to the Electronic Privacy Information Center in 2004 under the Freedom of
Information Act: “Apparently, my name is on some watch list because everytime I
fly, I get delayed while the airline personnel call what they say is TSA,” wrote
a passenger whose name was blacked out. Noting that he was a high-level federal
worker, he asked what he could do to remove his name from the list.
The answer, Kopel said, is little. A unit at the screening center responds
to complaints, he said, but will not remove a name if it is shared by a
terrorism suspect. Instead, people not on the list who share a name with someone
listed can be issued letters instructing airline personnel to check with the TSA
to verify their identity. The GAO reported that 31 names were removed in
2005.
A process under fire A recent review of the entire Terrorist Screening
Center database was temporarily abandoned when it proved too much work even for
the night crew, which generally handles less of a workload. But the no-fly and
selectee lists are being scrubbed to emphasize “people we think are a danger to
the plane, and not for some other reason they met the criteria,” Kopel
said.
A separate TSA system that would check every passenger name against the
screening center’s database has been shelved over concern that it could grow
into a massive surveillance program. The Department of Homeland Security was
rebuked by Congress in December for trying to develop a risk-assessment program
to profile travelers entering and leaving the United States based on airline and
financial data.
Kopel insisted that private information on Americans, such as credit-card
records, never makes it into the screening center database and that “we rely 100
percent on government-owned information.”
The center came in for ridicule last year when CBS’s “60 Minutes” noted
that 14 of the 19 Sept. 11 hijackers were listed — five years after their
deaths. Kopel defended the listings, saying that “we know for a fact that these
people will use names that they believe we are not going to list because they’re
out of circulation — either because they’re dead or incarcerated… . It’s
not willy-nilly. Every name on the list, there’s a reason that it’s on
there.”
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